Political trust and support in diverse democracies

Anaïd Flesken and Jakob Hartl

University of Bristol, UK

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Abstract

While political support is shown to be lower among ethnic minorities, it is unclear whether this due to psychological "sore loser" effects or lacking representation. This paper examines the link with World Value Survey data in 49 countries over four waves. We use an original operationalization of ethnic group status by combining WVS data with information from the Ethnic Power Relations dataset, which codes ethnic groups worldwide with regard to their political relevance and status. Preliminary multilevel analyses suggest that the ethnic gap in political attitudes remains even when controlling for political affiliation but that it is stronger for trust and perceptions of electoral integrity than for satisfaction with democracy.

Introduction

Attitudinal research on political trusts and support consistently shows that electoral losers are less satisfied with the way democracy works in their country than electoral winners, and that the effect is stronger if respondents lose repeatedly. Marginalized ethnic groups are, by their very definition, consistently "losing" the electoral contest – either because they are in the minority or because they are excluded from participation – which is expected to undermine their political trust and support for the political system. In the absence of a voice in the process, they may turn to exit the democratic political realm. But while the political science literature has often warned of such dire consequences, we lack reliable evidence of the link between ethnic group membership and attitudinal outcomes like political trust and support. This paper makes two contributions towards filling this gap: it directly examines the link with large-scale survey data, and in doing so proposes a novel operationalization of ethnic group membership that takes political relevance into account.

We test the "ethnic loser" hypothesis in an analysis of ethnic power relations and individual attitudes in 49 countries over the four latest waves of the World Values Survey (WVS), conducted between 1995 and 2014. In contrast to many other large-scale survey efforts, the WVS includes a variety of democracies in different world regions, covering, for example, Australia, Canada, and Spain but also Ecuador, Ghana, and the Philippines. We examine three dependent variables to capture the nuances of political support: first, respondents' confidence in political institutions, in particular in parliaments and governments, as well as, second, their satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country. Third, we also make use of a new battery of items on perceptions of electoral integrity asked in a

subset of countries in the sixth wave of the WVS in order to adjudicate whether levels of support are due to respondents' assessment of democratic performance or indeed a lack of legitimacy of the democratic process itself.

The main independent variable is respondents' ethnic group membership, for which we use a novel operationalization that takes political relevance into account by combining survey data with information from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset, which codes ethnic groups in each country with regard to their political relevance and status, and use a variety of country-specific classifications regarding ethnicity, language, religion, and region, to match the group descriptors in the EPR dataset and assign them the respective EPR status.

We examine the data in a multilevel analysis that considers both individual and contextual characteristics in a single model. Preliminary results show that ethnic status is a significant indicator of political support even when controlling for political affiliation with government actors. However, the effect of ethnic status is stronger for trust in institutions and perceptions of procedural fairness than for output legitimacy of the democratic system, which seems to be more strongly influenced by political affiliation.

Dependent variables

Attitudinal research on political trusts and support consistently shows that electoral losers are less satisfied with the way democracy works in their country than electoral winners, and that the effect is stronger if respondents lose repeatedly. Marginalized ethnic groups are, by their very definition, consistently "losing" the electoral contest or even excluded from participating in it, which is expected to undermine their support for the political system.

In this paper, we focus on the current regime as object of political support. The most commonly used components of political support in empirical analyses are trust in government institutions and evaluations of regime performance (Easton, 1965; Norris, 2011). Trust in an institution is here understood as it possessing the attributes of trustworthiness: that the institution has both a commitment and the competence to act in the interests of the potential trusters. Research on political trust widely agrees that citizens' expressed trust or distrust is largely a consequence of their political outlook and experiences rather than their psychological or social characteristics (Levi & Stoker, 2000).

Regime performance goes beyond this specific support for the different branches of government. We examine two dimensions of regime performance: output legitimacy and procedural fairness. Output legitimacy is often measured through people's satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country (Linde & Ekman, 2003; Norris, 2011), and we do the same here. We then go beyond standard practice and analyse respondent assessments of the democratic process directly by examining perceptions of electoral integrity. In contrast to satisfaction with democracy, evaluations of electoral integrity should be less influenced by regime output because they concern specific practices with which citizens are more familiar than, say, the day-to-day work of parliament. Empirically, voter confidence in the fair conduct of elections and political support for government have indeed been shown to capture different underlying constructs (Atkeson, Alvarez, & Hall, 2015).

The empirical analysis is based on public opinion data collected by the World Values Survey (WVS) in four waves between 1995 and 2014 (World Values Survey, 2016). Data on all variables is available for 49 countries covered in the survey, resulting in a total sample size of 74,196 respondents. Not all countries took part in all four waves, which results in a total of 77 country-wave observations. For the analysis of electoral integrity, only data from one wave and 23 countries is available.

Trust in institutions is measured with a set of questions asked in all four waves: "Could you tell me how much confidence you have in [an organization]: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?" We focus on regime institutions, that is, on respondents' confidence in government, parliament, political parties, courts, civil service, army, and police (see alsoNorris, 2011). A factor analysis confirms that they all load on one factor. To minimize data loss and avoid introducing bias through listwise deletion (King, Honaker, Joseph, & Scheve, 2001) – particularly important where the observed groups are already small and where there is not-at-random non-response, as is the case when considering ethnic minorities – we use a decision-tree procedure with country-wave, age, gender, education, income, subjective social class, and ethnic status to impute median values for missing answers.[1] We then created a summative index of trust, with the individual items weighted by the factor loadings of the factor analysis. Like all following continuous measures, the index is then rescaled to range from 0 (here low levels of trust) to 1 (high levels of trust).

Output legitimacy, or *satisfaction with democracy*, is measured with the question asked in the fifth and sixth wave of the WVS "And how democratically is this country being governed today?" Respondents can choose on a scale from 1 to 10, where 1 means "not all democratic" and 10 means "completely democratic". Unfortunately this is only a single-item measure but no other question captures this aspect of political support. The item has been used by itself in numerous other studies on support. Just like for trust, we imputed the median for missing values. We rescaled the answers to 0 to 1 to match the other measures.

Perceptions of electoral integrity are newly covered in the sixth wave of the WVS (2010-2014), which includes a battery of nine questions designed to measure individual-level perceptions of electoral integrity (IPEI) at different stages in the electoral process (see Norris, 2014). This disaggregated measure of IPEI allows for the development of a more reliable indicator than those based on a single item, as is the case in other comparative surveys. Respondents were asked "In your view, how often do the following things occur in the country's elections?"

a) Votes are counted fairly;
b) Opposition candidates are prevented from running;
c) TV news favours the governing party;
d) Voters are bribed;
e) Journalists provide fair coverage of elections;
f) Election officials are fair;
g) Rich people buy elections;
h) Voters are threatened with violence at the polls;
i) Voters are offered a genuine choice at the ballot box.

Responses to each item were coded from "Very often" (1) to "Not at all often" (4).

As the nine items each show varying degrees of non-response we use propensity score matching to impute missing values (Austin, 2011; Bacher, 2002). A principal component analysis (PCA) shows that the items load on two different dimensions which we call, following Norris (2013), electoral integrity (items a, e, f, and i) and electoral malpractice (items b, c, d, g, and h). However, only the electoral integrity dimension is stable in all countries. We hence use only this dimension as dependent variable, combining the four items into an index. To do so, we first reverse the coding such that a higher number

[1] We estimated the hierarchy of the decision tree for each variable using multinomial regression modelling.

denotes a higher IPEI. We then weight each item by the component loadings derived from the PCA and build a summative index and rescaled it to range from 0 to 1.

Independent variables at the individual level

The main independent variable is ethnic group status. Previous analyses of ethnic background – often merely included as control variable, where included at the individual level at all – have used a single ethnic group identifier available in their respective survey and have done so in isolation of the political context. But while, for example, religious identification is politically important in Northern Ireland, it is not relevant in Australia. Ignoring the politicization of ethnicity leads to invalid inferences about the role of ethnic "loss" in increasing feelings of political inclusion or exclusion among minorities. We hence operationalize ethnic group status by combining our survey data with information from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) dataset, which codes ethnic groups in each country with regard to their political relevance and status (Vogt et al., 2015; Wimmer, Cederman, & Min, 2009).

The EPR provides annual data on politically relevant ethnic groups and their access to state power from 1946 to 2013, for all states with at least 500,000 inhabitants. EPR's inclusion criterion is whether the ethnic group in question is politically relevant, that is, a group is included "if at least one political organization has claimed to represent its interests at the national level or if its members are subjected to state-led political discrimination" (Vogt et al., 2015, p. 3). In contrast to, for example, the Minorities at Risk (MAR) dataset (Gurr, 1993), the EPR hence also includes majority groups, and in contrast to the new All Minority at Risk (A-MAR) dataset (Birnir et al., 2012), it codes all groups according to their access to state power. In addition, as ethnicity is fluid and power relations changeable, the EPR allows codes to vary on an annual basis (which was accounted for in our coding procedure).

Groups' access to state power is coded as either of seven categories: monopoly, dominant, senior partner, junior partner, powerless, discriminated, or self-excluded. Groups in the first two categories rule alone, but in contrast to monopoly power, dominant power indicates some limited representation of other groups by "token" members. The senior and junior partner categories indicate that groups share power in formal or informal power sharing arrangements. Designation as senior or junior refers to a groups' absolute influence in the executive, irrespective of absolute group size. Groups in the final three categories are excluded from state power. Powerless groups lack representation or influence in central government, while discriminated groups are subject to active, deliberate, and directed discrimination in the political realm. Self-exclusion refers to groups who excluded themselves from central government, instead controlling a particular territory claimed to be independent from the state. We excluded the self-exclusion category from our analysis since members of such groups by definition do not belong to the polity.

We matched WVS respondents to the groups identified in the EPR by combining demographic information provided in the survey, including country-specific classifications regarding ethnicity, language, religion, and region, and assigned them the respective status. This required individual coding per country and, in most cases, also per wave as different information was captured in the WVS and as power relations were coded differently in the EPR. For example, in Georgia respondents speaking Armenian, Asirien, Azerbaijani, or Russian are coded as powerless since these are equivalent to the powerless language groups described in EPR. Similarly, Muslim respondents were coded as powerless. Non-Muslim Georgian-speakers were coded as dominant group members. In Mexico, in contrast, skin colour is more important than religion or language in distinguishing between ethnic group statuses. Members of "other minorities" were excluded from the dataset since their non-identification makes it likely that they are not member of a politically relevant group, and that their group was very small. Respondents whose ethnicity could not be identified due to item-non-response

were also excluded. Some respondents may still have been allocated to the wrong group due to interviewer effects and coding errors, but if this has any statistical effect, it will at most dilute the differences between groups and hence depress significance levels: where differences are found to exist, a clearer categorisation might only lead to a clearer difference.

To enable cross-country comparisons we collapsed the EPR status categories in two ways. First, we followed the core categorisation and coded group members as having absolute access to state power, as sharing power, and as being powerless. Second, we condensed the categories even further into politically included (monopoly, dominant, senior partner, junior partner) and excluded (powerless and discriminated). Overall, we could assign these categories to 185,830 respondents in 68 countries over all four waves. Forty-seven countries are covered more than once.

In addition to ethnicity, political affiliation is important to see whether respondents belong to the electoral losers or winners in their respective country-waves. In previous studies, political affiliation had a consistent and strong effect on measures of political support. We coded respondents as winners or losers according to whether they support the party or coalition of parties in power or those in the opposition at the time of the survey. Finally, at the individual level we also control for the usual socio-economic variables (age (log), gender, income, and education) in the analysis.

Independent variables at the country level

Beyond individual-level variables we also consider the country context, especially since the WVS includes a wide variety of countries. In addition to the level of socio-economic development, the following country-level factors have been argued to affect levels of political support and perceptions of electoral integrity: the age, quality, and type of democracy (e.g. Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan, & Listhaug, 2005; Birch, 2008; Coffé, 2016).

Age of democracy is important because in countries with long democratic experience both politicians and citizens have had time to learn that electoral loss may not mean grave and/or permanent exclusion from decision-making, and general levels of trust in the system – and the process – are higher. We use age of democracy in number of years since the last drastic change in democratic regime scores according to the Polity IV index, as captured by the variable "durable".

With regard to quality of democracy, we do not use the usual indices, as these are strongly correlated with age of democracy, but instead consider *media freedom* as a proxy. We use the measure of access to unbiased media in the year 2012, as reported in the Varieties of Democracy dataset (variable "v2meaccess"; Coppedge et al., 2015).

The type of democracy is also important as political institutions can mitigate the gap at the individual level. We examine type of democracy through *disproportionality* of votes to seats. More proportional systems ease the impact of losing through a fairer representation of the vote in parliament. Where parliaments include smaller parties and the need for coalition governments or a more consensual decision-making style arises, the gap in political support more generally between losers and winners is smaller than in majoritarian democracies. We use the Gallagher Index of Disproportionality (GID), which indicates the difference between the percentage of votes and the percentage of parliamentary seats received (Gallagher, 2015).

Finally, countries rated higher in socio-economic development tend to have a strongly professionalized press and a higher percentage of the population who tunes into the news. We use the *GDP per capita* provided by the World Bank. Data for Taiwan was entered from the country's

statistics office. Like all other continuous measures, values were rescaled to lie between 0 (here low GDP) and 1 (high GDP).

For the analysis of perceptions of electoral integrity only, we also use a measure of electoral integrity at the country level, provided by the Perception of Electoral Integrity Index (PEI; Norris, Martínez, Nai, & Grömping, 2016). The PEI index is built upon a survey, administered to country experts immediately following the national elections in the respective country. The experts are asked to evaluate the extent to which the different stages of the electoral process meet international standards, including nearly identical questions to those asked in the WVS. While, in contrast to the WVS, the expert survey refers to a specific election and in some countries has been conducted only after the WVS, it is a useful indicator of general electoral integrity in this paper: a comparison of the PEI index with other measures of electoral quality such as NELDA (National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy) and IEM (Index of Electoral Malpractice) shows strong positive correlations (Norris, 2013). We use the summary indicator "PEIIndexi", rescaled to range from 0 to 1, with 1 denoting higher electoral integrity according to country experts.

Method

We employ a multilevel method to take into account the clustered nature of the data (Steenbergen & Jones, 2002). In repeated, cross-sectional survey data individuals are clustered within both survey waves and countries. To account for the clustering, we model country as the highest level, country-years as the second level, and individual respondents as the first level. With this three-level structure, the model takes into account both that individuals from the same country have more in common than individuals from different countries and that individuals observed in the same country in the same year are more similar than individuals observed in the same country but in a different year (Schmidt-Catran & Fairbrother, 2016).

For modelling purposes, the country-level variables are divided into a between (or cross-sectional) component at the third level and a within (or longitudinal) component at the second level. The between component is the country-level's mean across all survey waves, whereas the within component is the deviation from the mean in the respective survey year (Fairbrother, 2014). While the country-level variables are only included as controls, the design allows distinguishing between the effect of the overall level of, for example, wealth and that of an increase or decrease in wealth. To account for potential wave or time effects, we include a wave dummy. For the analysis of perceptions of electoral integrity, whose items are only included in one wave, we revert to a two-level model with country as second level.

Results

Tables 1-3 report the results of five models for each respective dependent variable. In each table, the *null model* is useful for identifying each level's share of the total variance in the dependent variable. Trust in government institutions are explained to 3.5% at the country-wave level, 11% at the country level, and 85.5% at the individual level. These shares suggests that levels of trust are reasonably stable over time and to a large extent vary within countries. Satisfaction with democracy behaves similarly, with shares of variance of 1.5% at the country-wave level, 13.7% at the country level, and 84.8% at the individual level. Perceptions of electoral integrity are explained to 10.5% by variance at the country level and 89.5% at the individual level. Overall, the shares suggest that we do well in looking at individual-level attributes in explaining different indicators for political support. The following models determine to what extent ethnic or party political affiliation are at fault.

[Tables 1-3 about here]

In each table, the *ethnicity model* considers only ethnic status in addition to control variables, the *politics model* only political affiliation, and the *all model* all together. With regard to the coefficients, most of the models look very similar. Not surprisingly, respondents without any access to government have significantly less trust in government institutions and are significantly less satisfied with the way democracy works in their countries than respondents with absolute access to power. In Tables 1 and 2, however, respondents with shared access to power do not differ significantly from the latter. This confirms evidence from conflict data in other studies that it is not ethnic differences per se but differential access to power that drives grievances (e.g. Birnir, 2007). In Table 3, respondents sharing access to power also have significantly worse perceptions of electoral integrity than those with absolute access to power.

In all tables, the effects of ethnic status remain the same when including political affiliation, which suggests that ethnicity does add something beyond political interests and is hence not easily replaceable with other cleavages – if they were commensurable, the effects would level each other out. As expected, respondents not affiliated with the electoral winner (that is, losers and undecided voters) show significantly lower levels of political support. All other coefficients are also reasonably stable between models. At the contextual level, trust in institutions (Table 1) is stronger the weaker economic growth and the fewer people have access to unbiased media sources. Satisfaction with democracy (Table 2) and perception of electoral integrity (Table 3) are stronger in more affluent countries, but with regard to the former the effect vanishes once including political inclinations in the models.

It remains examining model fit in order to determine the role of ethnic status in explaining political support. The comparison of Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) provides evidence of model fit. For trust in institutions (Table 1) as well as perceptions of electoral integrity (Table 3), the AIC is considerably smaller for the ethnicity model and hence suggests that ethnic status is a better predictor of political support than political affiliation. For satisfaction with democracy (Table 2), in contrast, the AIC is considerably smaller for the politics model, which suggests that political status is a better predictor. Taken together, the results indicate that, with regard to output legitimacy, policy representation is somewhat more important than ethnic status in determining grievances. Trust in institutions and procedures, however, is more strongly affected by ethnic status than political interest.

Discussion and conclusion

This preliminary analysis has sought to examine the effect of ethnicity on political support. The approach taken here was informed by the constructivist approach toward ethnicity that, for an internationally comparative analysis, we cannot use the nature of ethnic attributes for categorisation of respondents – such as whether the main ethnic cleavage runs along linguistic, cultural, or religious cleavages – but need to use the functional equivalent of social or political relevance of the ethnic cleavage. Here we used the political relevance of ethnic cleavages to examine the claim that ethnic minorities are permanent losers in electoral systems and hence show lower levels of political support with regard to trust in government institutions, satisfaction with democracy, and perceptions of electoral integrity. The paper thus aims to make two contributions: toward the operationalization of ethnicity in comparative survey data and to its substantive effect with regard to political support. We found support for this hypothesis, demonstrating that ethnic status is a significant indicator even when controlling for political affiliation with government actors. However, the effect of ethnic status is stronger for trust in institutions and perceptions of procedural fairness than for output legitimacy of the democratic system, which seems to be more strongly influenced by political affiliation.

With regard to the analysis of political support, a number of points need to be considered in future iterations of this paper. In particular, the question of the relationship between the three dependent variables need to be considered more closely: empirically speaking, why does political trust seem to be more similar to perceptions of electoral integrity than satisfaction with democracy? Conceptually, beyond factor analyses, is each of the concepts comparable across countries?

With regard to ethnic status, some potential points of criticism may be countered already here. One criticism of the coding of ethnic groups in general is that the process itself reifies groups and attributes agency to mere social categories (Brubaker, 2002; Vogt et al., 2015). Yet the main focus of this paper is to see whether we can actually do so: whether different degrees of access to state power by political actors claiming to represent members of their group does indeed make a difference to the members of the group. Individuals, not groups, are the unit of analysis here.

Another general point of criticism of datasets operationalizing ethnicity is that they do "not include the universe of all potential groups with which individuals could identify [… nor] account for the multiple identities an individual may have" (Marquardt & Herrera, 2015, p. 691). Yet again this is the point set out to be tested here: whether ones politically relevant ethnic group membership affects attitudes or whether other identities may be as or even more important. To put it differently, the purpose of this paper was not to show that ethnicity affects attitudes but to test whether access to state power structured by ethnicity does.

A more specific point of criticism may be selection bias in our data by including only groups with a minimal level of political agency. If our outcomes of interest – political attitudes – are dependent upon the level of political agency, the analysis is biased. We hold this to be unlikely. Following social movement theory, political mobilisation depends on motive, means, and opportunity (e.g. Tarrow, 1998). If members of the group do not have a motive to mobilise, their political attitudes should not differ from the majority population to which they belong by default. If they do have a motive but not the means or the opportunity, this is likely due to systemic discrimination, which is covered in the EPR inclusion criteria as well.

Practically speaking, a more complete analysis could include all socially, not just politically, relevant groups as provided in the new All-Minorities At Risk dataset (Birnir et al., 2012). This is infeasible here because the coding of groups in A-MAR is neither time sensitive nor does it include a measure of access to power for all groups. However, note that the same analysis using EPR and A-MAR provided substantially similar results (Birnir et al., 2012; Cederman, Wimmer, & Min, 2010) and hence speak against selection bias in the EPR data (see Vogt et al., 2015).

It may also be criticized that the EPR is focused on access to state power at the executive level. This coding assumes that, for example, representation in the legislative but in the opposition means that the group is powerless. In this paper, we skirted this problem by including variables on the age, quality, and type of democracy into the analysis with the understanding that more advanced democracies should provide oppositional parties more influence than less advanced democracies. Future research may focus on representation in the legislation. Birnir and colleagues have begun work to this effect (reference).

Finally, it may be debatable to put EPR's powerless and discriminated into one category as they do seem to be substantial differences between them. Keeping them separated in the analysis is, however, not feasible as only very respondents' belong to either category. This is a general problem with survey research into ethnic minorities. Future iterations of this paper will deal with all these points more specifically.

Table 1: trust in institutions

	null	ethnicity	politics	all
Fixed Parts				
(Intercept)	0.47***	0.65 ***	0.65 ***	0.66 ***
ethnicity (no access)		-0.02 ***		-0.02 ***
ethnicity (shared access)		-0.01		-0.01
affiliation (loser)			-0.06 ***	-0.06 ***
affiliation (undecided)			-0.06 ***	-0.06 ***
gender (female)		*0.00 ** *	*0.00 *** *	*0.00 ** *
age (log)		*0.01 *** *	*0.01 *** *	*0.01 *** *
education		*-0.04 *** *	*-0.04 *** *	*-0.04 *** *
income		*0.00*	*0.01 * *	*0.01 * *
interest (yes)		*0.05 *** *	*0.04 *** *	*0.04 *** *
deviation age of democracy		*-0.21*	*-0.05*	*-0.06*
deviation media access		*-0.06*	*-0.07*	*-0.07*
deviation GDP pc		*-0.47 * *	*-0.52 * *	*-0.51 * *
mean age of democracy		*-0.03*	*-0.01*	*-0.01*
mean media access		*-0.20 ** *	*-0.17 ** *	*-0.17 ** *
mean GDP pc		*0.46*	*0.36*	*0.37*
wave dummy		*-0.01*	*-0.01*	*-0.01*
Random Parts				
σ^2	0.039	0.038	0.038	0.038
$\tau_{00,\ countrywave}$	0.0016	0.001	0.001	0.001
$\tau_{00,\ COUNTRY}$	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004
$N_{countrywave}$	77	77	77	77
$N_{COUNTRY}$	49	49	49	49
$ICC_{countrywave}$		0.028	0.028	0.028
$ICC_{COUNTRY}$		0.097	0.087	0.087
Observations	74169	74196	74196	74196
AIC	29582.3	30828.4	32149.1	32182.1

Notes: ** p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001*

Table 2: satisfaction with democracy

	null	ethnicity	politics	all
Fixed Parts				
(Intercept)	0.58***	0.43 **	0.45 **	0.44 **
ethnicity (no access)		-0.04 ***		-0.03 ***
ethnicity (shared access)		-0.01		-0.00
affiliation (loser)			-0.08 ***	-0.08 ***
affiliation (undecided)			-0.06 ***	-0.06 ***
gender (female)		*0.01 ** *	*0.01 ** *	*0.01 ** *
age (log)		*-0.01 * *	*-0.01 * *	*-0.01 * *
education		*-0.03 *** *	*-0.02 *** *	*-0.02 *** *
income		*0.11 *** *	*0.11 *** *	*0.11 *** *
interest (yes)		*0.03 *** *	*0.03 *** *	*0.03 *** *
deviation age of democracy		*0.92 *	*0.93 *	*1.01 *
deviation media access		*-0.20 *	*-0.20 *	*-0.21 *
deviation GDP pc		*0.06 *	*-0.02 *	*-0.01 *
mean age of democracy		*-0.12 *	*-0.08 *	*-0.08 *
mean media access		*0.01 *	*0.04 *	*0.04 *
mean GDP pc		*1.08 **	*0.93 *	*0.93 *
wave dummy		*0.01 *	*0.01 *	*0.02 *
Random Parts				
σ^2	0.0641	0.063	0.062	0.062
$\tau_{00,\ countrywave}$	0.0011	0.001	0.001	0.001
$\tau_{00,\ COUNTRY}$	0.0104	0.009	0.008	0.008
$N_{countrywave}$	52	52	52	52
$N_{COUNTRY}$	41	41	41	41
$ICC_{countrywave}$		0.008	0.014	0.012
$ICC_{COUNTRY}$		0.118	0.108	0.110
Observations	51556	51556	51556	51556
AIC	4948.4	4223.3	3269.3	3233.0

Notes: ** p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001*

Table 3: perceptions of electoral integrity

	null	ethnicity	politics	all
Fixed Parts				
(Intercept)	0.59***	0.46 ***	0.44 ***	0.46 ***
ethnicity (no access)		-0.04 ***		-0.03 ***
ethnicity (shared access)		-0.04 ***		-0.02 *
affiliation (loser)			-0.07 ***	-0.07 ***
affiliation (undecided)			-0.06 ***	-0.06 ***
gender (female)		*0.01*	*0.01*	*0.00*
age (log)		*0.04 *****	*0.04 *****	*0.04 *****
education		*-0.00*	*0.00*	*0.00*
income		*0.02 ***	*0.02 **	*0.02 **
interest (yes)		*0.02 *****	*0.02 *****	*0.02 *****
age of democracy		*-0.33 **	*-0.22*	*-0.26*
media access		*-0.00*	*0.06*	*0.05*
GDP pc		*0.95 ***	*0.82 ***	*0.84 ***
PEI		*0.17*	*0.16*	*0.17*
Random Parts				
σ^2	0.0453	0.045	0.044	0.044
$\tau_{00,\ COUNTRY}$	0.0053	0.002	0.002	0.001
$N_{COUNTRY}$	23	23	23	23
$ICC_{COUNTRY}$		0.037	0.035	0.032
Observations	22571	22571	22571	22571
AIC	5688.1	5838.1	6338.3	6371.9

Notes: ** p<.05 ** p<.01 *** p<.001*

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